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Abstract 
      Employing the Japan-U.S. international survey, this study analyzed the cause of rising 
perception of the widening income gap in Japan. Between these two countries, their distinct 
value judgments on the substance of gap influence their recognition. Japanese have negative 
perception of the income gap caused by talent, academic background or luck; it seems relatively 
weak in the U.S. A large portion of Japanese also think one’s income is recently decided by talent, 
academic background or luck though it should not be. Such disagreement between the desirable 
and recognized determinants of income is thought to raise their perception of the gap. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
      From the year 2005 through 2006, expansion of the income gap received large 
public attention in Japan. Some of the Japanese best sellers in 2005 addressed a 
classed society. The issue of gap in society was also debated in the Diet in 2006. The 
debates stemmed from not only political backgrounds, including the argument about a 
series of recent structural reforms or the upcoming presidential election of a ruling 
party, but also the rising perception of economic inequality among Japanese. In fact, 
according to the results of National Survey on Lifestyle Preferences (conducted by the 
Cabinet Office, Government of Japan) since the 1980’s, an increasing percentage of 
people thought that their preference for low inequality of income and property has 
been almost unsatisfied. The percentage reached a quarter of the whole in the 2005 
survey. Parallel to the increase in such public concern, the income gap in Japan has 
actually continued to rise since the end of the 1970’s, as shown in Figure 1. 
      Why has the income gap in Japan continued to expand? Discussing the issue 
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thoroughly, Ohtake (2005) states that a large part of the continuing income gap 
expansion can be explained by the ageing of population. The gap within each age 
group, except recent twenties, has remained unchanged in Japan. Income inequality, 
on the whole, has nevertheless been widened by the ageing of the Japanese population. 
The income gap has been greater within the older group in Japan. Such a lifelong gap 
starts widening around the age of forty, when the speed of promotion begins to differ 
among employees. Japanese ageing has thus enlarged the groups of larger income gap 
and increased inequality. On the one hand, the income gap among the younger 
generation rose from the end of the 1990’s through the beginning of the 2000’s. This 
recent trend was caused by the rapid increase of freelancers and the unemployed in 
their seriously bleak employment situation. Another characteristic observed since the 
late 1990’s is the decrease in wages earned by the low-wage group of male workers. 
      As explained above, the widening gap in the flow of income can be explained 
by the population’s ageing. The gap in lifetime income could, however, have widened 
even if the within-group gap had hardly changed. Less frequent movements across 
income classes would result in a wider gap in lifetime income, even if the gap were 
unchanged within each age group. The widening of the gap between assets would also 
yield the same effect. In fact, the gap in consumption, which is a proxy of lifetime 
income inequality, tends to widen among the age groups under fifties (Ohtake, 2005). 
      Although the Japanese long-term trend of the income gap stems from the 
ageing of the population, the upward tendency of the income gap has never been a 
unique observation in Japan. As is well known, the U.S. income gap has also shown 
its tendency to expand (Figure 1). In fact, the cause of such expansion has been one of 
the big issues among economists since the 1980’s1. Among the studies in the United 
States, many of them have addressed the skill-biased technical change (SBTC) and the 
globalization of economy as the potential causes of the widening income gap. These 
studies concluded the following two reasons are responsible for the expansion of the 
income gap in the 1980’s. First, the technological progress had been biased in favor of 
the labor demand for highly educated or high-skilled workers. Second, the 
                                                 
1 For instance, see Katz and Autor (1999). 
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globalization of economy had decreased the labor demand for lower-educated workers 
in developed countries.  
      The U.S. upward trend after the 1990’s is, by comparison, recently 
characterized by the rapid income growth of high-income earners and highly educated 
workers and by the within-group income dispersion among the highly educated group2. 
According to Piketty and Saez (2006), the income share of the top 0.1% in the U.S. 
used to be around two percent from the 1960’s to 1970’s; on the other hand, the share 
exceeded seven percent in 2000. The growth of their income share is, in addition, 
accounted for by the increase in salaries instead of capital income. Such increase in 
the income concentration is commonly observed in the English-speaking countries, 
including the United Kingdom and Canada. In contrast, the income share of 
high-income earners in Japan and France has been stable at around two percent since 
the Second World War. The trend is unchanged since 20003. Decomposing the U.S. 
recent wage inequality, Lemieux (2006) also shows that the wage for the highly 
educated group has increased and their within-group wage dispersion has widened 
during the same period of time. Besides, Autor et al. (2006) suggest that the 
computerization of work has brought about the polarization of wage distribution in 
the U.S. 
      Piketty and Saez (2006) and Autor et al. (2006) furthermore provide the 
following reasons for the recent increase in income inequality in the U.S. First, the 
routine tasks of white-collar workers have been replaced by computers; consequently, 
jobs have been polarized into manual tasks and high-skilled work beyond the reach of 
computerization. Second, the economic globalization initiated the unskilled 
labor-intensive exports of the developing countries to the developed ones, while 
computerization has allowed a part of white-collar jobs to be transferred from 
developed countries to developing ones. Third, because of such technological 
progress, the required skills of executives have become more general, industry-wide 
                                                 
2 See Autor et al. (2006), Lemieux (2006) and Piketty and Saez (2006). 
3 The research on the Japanese trend is based on Moriguchi and Saez (2006). Their study 
analyzed the data up to the year 2002; thus, the top-income share in Japan did not increased 
until then at least.   
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rather than firm-specific; therefore, the enlarged labor market of executives has 
produced a group of superstars, similar to the ones of singers and professional athletes, 
among these business elite. 
      The widening income gap in the U.S. has never been a political issue, although 
the gap has shown rapid expansion. The Japanese income gap is, by contrast, now the 
subject of political debate, whereas the income-gap expansion, excluding the part 
driven by ageing of the population, is small-scale4. Why do attitudes differ between 
Japan and the U.S.? 
      Employing the Japan-U.S. comparative survey data of Osaka University 21st 
Century Center of Excellence Program (February 2006), this research will examine 
the issue of income inequality as follows. First, this article will describe the 
difference in the recognition of the income gap and the different attitudes toward 
redistributive policies between Japan and the United States. Second, it will examine 
whether risk aversion parameter and altruism, supposed to be critical from an 
economic viewpoint, can actually explain attitudes toward the income gap. Third, it 
will clarify how the values in determinants of the income gap differ between the two 
countries. Forth, it will also examine whether those beliefs relate to the recognition of 
a widening gap in income. 
 
2. The Recognition of the Income Gap: Japan-U.S. Comparison 
Data 
      This paper’s analysis will be based on the data from two questionnaire 
surveys: (1) Osaka University 21st Century Center of Excellence Panel Survey 
[conducted in Japan] (OPSJ) and (2) Osaka University 21st Century Center of 
Excellence Panel Survey [conducted in the USA] (OPSUS). Their basic information is 
described below. 
      Both surveys contain hypothetical questions to measure a respondent’s risk 
aversion and altruistic attitude, as well as the individual attributes including 
                                                 
4 The Economist issued on June 16, 2006 also featured the low public interest in the income-gap 
expansion in the U.S. and the increasing attention to the same issue in Japan. 
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educational attainment, age and income. The principal questions used for this research 
are reproduced in Appendix 1. 
      OPSJ is a panel study begun in February 2004 as part of the Osaka University 
21st Century Center of Excellence Program. The survey has been conducted annually 
since 2004 using a random sample drawn from 6,000 individuals by a placement 
(self-administered) method. It had 4,224 and 2,987 respondents in 2004 and 2005, 
respectively. Excluding 108 individuals lost from the last 2,987 respondents, 2,000 
new random-sampled individuals were added to the survey sample in 2006. The 2006 
survey was then distributed to 4,879 individuals and the number of respondents was 
3,763. Its response rate was 77.1%, while the figure equals 47.1% for the total 8,000 
individuals included in any samples. This research will use the survey questions about 
the recognition of the income gap, which were included only in the 2006 survey.  
      OPSUS is also administered as part of the Osaka University 21st Century 
Center of Excellence Program. This mail survey was conducted with 12,338 
individuals in January and February 2005. The number of respondents was 4,979. 
Another survey was mailed to respondents of the 2005, with 3,120 responses being 
obtained in January and February 2006. The response rate in 2006 is equal to 25.3% 
for all 12,338 individuals in either sample or both. All the questions were the same as 
those in each OPSJ survey. 
 
The Japan-U.S. difference in the recognition of the income gap 
      In each country, the survey inquires about the respondents’ thought on changes 
in the following domestic gaps for the last and the next five years: (1) the gap between 
income or earnings, (2) the one between assets such as savings, stocks, land and 
housing, (3) the income gap due to differences between families which one grew up in, 
and (4) the gap between spending standards (Question 44 and Question 45). The 
questionnaire also asks about whether he or she considers the current expansion of the 
income gap as problematic (Question 46) and about the enforcement of redistributive 
policies (Question 47).  
      Using the responses to these questions, the Japan-U.S. difference in the 
 6
recognition of the income gap and in their attitudes toward to it will be examined. 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of those who recognize or expect the expansion of gaps 
between income or earnings, assets, and spending in the last or next five years. In the 
U.S., the figures are between 50 and 60 percent for the three kinds of gaps. The gaps 
of income and assets in Japan are, in contrast, recognized by 68 and 60 percent of the 
respondents respectively. It is also characteristic of the Japanese responses that the 
percentage is larger for those expecting the future expansion of gaps than for the 
people having recognition of such expansion in the last five years. 
      The proportion of those who agree with the enforcement of income 
redistribution from the rich to the poor (using the taxation system and social security 
policy) are 51.7% and 45.3% in Japan and the U.S. respectively. The Japanese 
percentage is significantly greater than its U.S. counterpart (Figure 3). The larger 
percentage of the support for redistribution in Japan cannot be attributed to the 
Japanese higher portion of those considering the widening income gap as problematic. 
In both Japan and the U.S., approximately 73 percent of respondents view the gaps as 
problems, yielding no significant difference between the percentages statistically. 
Thus, the different thoughts on the necessity of enforcing redistribution between the 
two states cannot be caused by the difference in their values viewing the income-gap 
expansion, but by their contrasting recognition of the enlarging income gaps. 
 
Thoughts on the income gap by income groups 
      For higher income groups, a larger share of people recognizes and expects the 
expansion of the income gap (Figure 4, 5). The positions of income groups arranged 
in order of the income-gap recognition are, interestingly, different to the one in order 
of the share of individuals viewing the gap as problematic. In both Japan and the U.S., 
the portion of people considering the income-gap expansion as unproblematic is 
greater for higher income groups. In addition, the share of those who support the 
enforcement of redistribution policy is higher for lower income groups. 
 
Thoughts on the income gap by age groups 
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      Observing the recognition of the income gap by each age group of Japan, the 
rate of recognition among the forties and fifties is higher than the others’ (Figure 6). 
In addition, the age groups from forties to sixties bear the larger shares of those 
viewing the gap as problematic. In contrast, the portion of individuals viewing the 
income gap as problematic is the lowest in the group in their 20s than others, while 
the within-group gap in income and earnings among the twenties has been observed 
widening in actual data. The support for redistributive policies is relatively high for 
the groups aged fifty or over in Japan. 
      In the United States, the rate of income-gap recognition is comparatively high 
in the age groups in their 20s and 50s, while the share of those expecting the gap to 
widen is higher in the age groups less than 60 (Figure 7). On the other hand, the share 
of people viewing the income gap as problematic is larger in the groups aged fifty or 
older. The U.S. share of those supporting the enforcement of redistributive policies is 
high among the age groups in their 20s. 
 
Thoughts on the income gap by genders 
      Comparing the share of those recognizing the widening income gap and that of 
those expecting a future expansion of the gap, men bear larger percentages for those 
two points than women in Japan and the U.S (Figure 8, 9). On the one hand, the 
portion of females viewing the income gap as problematic is higher than males. On 
the other hand, the share of males supporting the enforcement of income 
redistribution is larger than females in Japan, probably because a smaller percentage 
of women recognize the widening income gap than men. 
 
3. Determinants of Thoughts on the Income Gap: Regression Analyses 
      This section will relate the people’s recognition of a widening income gap and 
their views on it to their individual attributes, basing the relations on the results of the 
following regression analyses. Employing Japanese data in 2002, Tomioka and Ohtake 
(2005) found that those who recognize the expansion of the income gap were 
composed of females, middle aged, or highly educated people and those expecting the 
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unemployment of their family members or themselves. The enforcement of 
redistributive policies was supported by those aged fifty or older, expecting their 
unemployment, being risk averse or categorized as low-income individuals. Do we 
find the same result from the Japan-U.S. international survey in 2006 for this 
comparative study? 
 
Determinants of support for redistribution 
      The economic determinants of support for redistributive policies will be 
briefly laid out5. Within a static framework, a lower-income class, supposed to benefit 
more, is expected to agree with the redistribution, whereas a higher-income class, 
incurring a heavier burden, is predicted to oppose such policies. The preceding studies 
have actually proved the negative correlation between income level and the support 
for redistribution. 
      However, if there exists mobility across income classes in the future, current 
income is not the sole determinant of support for redistribution today. Benabou and 
Ok (2001) theoretically pointed out the possibility that low-income people, 
considering their potential of becoming rich, do not support redistribution in a society 
with high mobility across income classes. They call that hypothesis the “Prospect of 
Upward Mobility” (POUM) Hypothesis. The high-income class may, on the other 
hand, support redistributive policies. Such attitudes conform to economic rationality, 
if the current rich predict the possibility of decline in their future income.  
      The empirical studies on the above issue include Alesina and La Ferrara 
(2005), which constructed an index of income mobility using the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) and found a negative correlation between the mobility and 
the individual support for redistribution. Using a data set from Russia, Ravallion and 
Lokshin (2000) argue that those expecting a decline in their welfare tend to support 
the equalization of individual income levels. They said that such tendency applies 
even to the current high-income group. Ohtake and Tomioka (2004), using Japanese 
data, showed that the supporters of redistribution in Japan comprise those expecting a 
                                                 
5 See Ohtake (2005) or Ohtake and Tomioka (2004) for detailed discussion. 
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decrease in their income through unemployment and those having the experience of a 
decline in their consumption level. 
      If the POUM hypothesis is correct and people expect their mobility across 
income classes, present low-income earners will not necessarily support the 
redistribution. If the prospect of moving up the income ladder decreases beyond a 
certain level of age, holding others constant, the aging should make individuals 
become more inclined to support the redistribution. Conforming to this hypothesis, 
the result of Ohtake and Tomioka (2004) indicated that older age groups are more 
likely to support redistribution in Japan. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), on the other 
hand, found that aging led people to be more reluctant to support redistribution in the 
U.S. 
      The important determinants of support for redistribution contain not only the 
economic environment like income classes and the mobility across those classes but 
also the individual preferences including attitudes toward risk and altruism. Risk 
averse individuals are, for instance, thought to be likely to support redistribution 
working as a safety net. Many empirical studies have used a self-employed dummy as 
an inverse proxy for risk aversion. When individual support for redistribution was a 
dependent variable in Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), the coefficient of the 
self-employment dummy was estimated to be significantly negative, which means the 
self-employed tend to oppose redistribution. The validity of that proxy, however, 
remains debatable. Ohtake and Tomioka (2004), in contrast, developed an alternative: 
the lowest percentage of rainfall in a weather forecast which makes respondents take 
umbrellas with them when going out. Using the alternative variable, they found that 
people became more likely to support redistributive policies, as they were more risk 
averse. In addition, high-income earners, incurring net loss from such policies, are 
also thought to support redistribution when they are sufficiently altruistic.  
 
Indices of risk aversion and altruism 
(Risk aversion) 
      This article employs two distinct indices of risk aversion. Each of them is 
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based on the responses to a different question. One of the indices equals one minus 
the lowest percentage of rainfall that makes the respondent take an umbrella with him 
when going out, as used in Ohtake and Tomioka (2004). Specifically, the responses 
are obtained from Question 18, asking, “When you usually go out, how high does the 
probability of rain have to be before you take an umbrella?”6 The other is the 
estimate of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) parameter, derived from the 
responses to a set of hypothetical questions asking about respondents’ preferable ways 
of receiving monthly income. See Appendix 2 for the estimation method. 
 
(Altruism) 
      A dummy variable serves as the index of altruism. The variable is based on the 
responses to Question 27 and 28, asking about the respondents’ will to donate to a 
charity giving financial help to the poor. That variable takes one if respondents 
showed their will to donate non-zero amounts of their family income in either of the 
following two hypothetical cases: (1) the donation would be handed to the poor 
directly, or (2) the charity would give twice the amount of their donation to the 
beneficiaries7. 
 
Estimation results 
      The four probit models, each adopting (1) Recognition of gap expansion, (2) 
Expectation of gap expansion, (3) Viewing the gap as problematic, and (4) Support for 
                                                 
6 Ohtake and Tomioka (2004), by contrast, used the question asking, “When you usually go out, 
how high does the probability of rain in a weather forecast have to be before you take an 
umbrella?” Any index derived from that question cannot distinguish the bias caused by 
respondents’ optimistic or pessimistic expectation of rain, or the effect of subjective evaluation 
of the forecasted probability, and the attitudes toward the objective probability of rain, 
classically regarded as risk aversion. The question used in this analysis, on the other hand, can 
separate the influence of such optimistic or pessimistic expectation from the risk preference. 
7  The indexes of risk aversion and altruism may bear measurement errors because the 
respondents could have failed to answer the questions accurately. Such errors would bias the 
coefficient of those indexes toward zero when they are employed as explanatory variables in an 
empirical analysis. Thus, this study also conducted the estimation with the mean values of 
indices measuring risk preference and altruism for the respondents of the same question in both 
the 2005 and 2006 surveys. The result of analysis basically remained unchanged from the 
counterpart based solely on the 2006 survey; thus, the following part of this paper will show the 
estimation employing only the 2006 survey. 
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redistribution as their dependent variables, were estimated for explaining (1) ~ (4) by 
individual attributes and the indexes of risk preference and altruism. Recognition of 
gap expansion is the dummy variable, taking unity if a respondent recognizes the 
expansion of a gap between income or earnings in the last five years; it otherwise 
equals zero (Question 44). Expectation of gap expansion is similarly the variable to 
equal one if a respondent expects the income gap to expand in the next five years 
(Question 45). Viewing the gap as problematic is, in addition, defined as the dummy 
variable to take unity if a respondent thinks the expansion of income or earnings is 
problematic (Question 46); Support for redistribution is also the binary variable to 
equal one if respondents agree with the enforcement of redistributive policies 
(Question 47-1).  
      Each estimation employed either of the two indexes of risk preference: the one 
based on probability of rain or the estimated CRRA coefficient. Concerning the 
results with the former index of risk preference, the estimated marginal effects of 
explanatory variables are shown in Appendix 4. Those effects are also depicted in 
Figures 10 and 118. 
 
(Estimation results for Japan) 
      The results from Japanese data are examined as follows (Figure 10). While the 
various individual attributes are controlled, the greater portion of the 40s and 50s has 
the recognition and the expectation of a widening gap between income or earnings 
than that of 20s. Concerning whether they view its expansion as problematic or not, 
however, no significant difference in opinion was found among all the age groups. 
The support for redistribution is greater in older age groups. The graduates (and those 
who have a postgraduate diploma) are more likely to recognize and expect the 
expansion of the income gap and are inclined to agree with redistributive policies. 
                                                 
8 The correlation coefficient of the CRRA parameter and the index based on the probability of 
rain is 0.028 for the Japanese sample; the counterpart of the U.S. equals -0.02. Neither is 
statistically significant. If there is any difference in the estimation results by the choice of risk 
preference parameter, it will be noted hereafter. The correlation between the risk aversion 
measured by the probability of precipitation and the altruism index is, in contrast, significantly 
positive for Japan and the U.S. 
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High-income earners tend to recognize the gap expansion and are less likely to view it 
as problematic than low-income individuals. The high-income groups are also less 
likely to agree with the enforcement of redistribution. Comparing the results by 
gender, it can be found that men are more likely to recognize the expansion of the 
income gap and support the enforcement of redistribution than women. Although 
women are more apt to view the gap as problematic, they are less likely to recognize 
its expansion than men. These tendencies can be interpreted as the reason why 
females are less inclined to support the enforcement of redistribution than males. In 
addition, those who expect the unemployment of their family members or themselves 
tend to recognize the gap’s expansion, view it as problematic and agree with 
redistribution. Moreover, the risk aversion parameter, measured by the lowest 
percentage of rainfall that makes one take an umbrella, shows no significant effect in 
all the estimation models statistically. Though the results are omitted, the increase in 
the CRRA coefficient decreases the recognition of income-gap expansion. The CRRA 
estimates, however, show no significant effects on the value judgment on its 
expansion and the support for redistributive policies. Furthermore, the altruistic 
respondents are more likely to regard the expansion as a problem and to agree with 
the enforcement of redistribution.  
      Among the above results, the effect of risk aversion parameter differs from the 
counterpart in Tomioka and Ohtake (2005) and Ohtake and Tomioka (2004). That 
parameter has shown its positive effects on the recognition of the gap expansion, 
viewing the gap as problematic and the support for redistributive policies. As noted in 
footnote 6, the risk aversion index employed in these previous studies could have also 
absorbed the pessimistic expectation of the future. This study’s index, by contrast, 
separated such pessimism from the risk preference itself. The pessimistic Japanese, 
rather than risk-averse ones, should thus be more likely to recognize the expansion of 
the gap between income or earnings and agree with the enforcement of redistributive 
policies. 
 
(Estimation results for the U.S.) 
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      Referring to Figure 11, the estimation results from the U.S. sample are next 
examined and compared to their Japanese counterparts. Compared to the results for 
Japan, a distinction can be found in the non-existence of a large difference by age 
with regard to the recognition of income-gap expansion and the value judgment on it 
in the U.S. In addition, the probability of agreeing with the enforcement of 
redistribution is significantly lower in the age group of the seventies and over. 
Moreover, the highly educated group is more likely to recognize the expansion of the 
income gap. It is consistent with the recent U.S. income-gap trend characterized with 
the more rapid expansion of within-group wage inequality for the highly educated 
group than for the others (Lemieux, 2006). On the one hand, whether they recognize 
the expansion of the gap between income or earnings does not significantly differ by 
income groups. On the other hand, the portion of people viewing the income gap as 
problematic or supporting redistribution is lower for higher income groups. Similar to 
the Japanese case, those who expect the unemployment of their family members or 
themselves are more likely to recognize the expansion of the gap and view it as 
problematic. Furthermore, those who experienced an increase in their consumption 
expenditure are inclined to expect the future expansion of the gap, regard the gap as a 
problem and agree with redistributive policies. If the increase in consumption 
reflected the future income growth, the above result would disagree with the POUM 
hypothesis. That result would rather show the effect of an unexpected shock to 
increase consumption while the income remained constant. Unlike the result for the 
Japanese, more risk averse people in the U.S. are likely to support the enforcement of 
redistribution. Besides, the altruistic U.S. citizens are significantly more apt to 
recognize the gap, view it as problematic and agree with the enforcement of 
redistributive policies. 
      The estimation results for these two countries can be summarized as follows. 
First, the highly educated group and those having the expectation of unemployment 
tend to recognize the expansion of the income gap. In addition, altruistic people and 
low-income earners are likely to support redistributive policies. These findings are 
obtained in both Japan and the U.S. Second, the middle-aged Japanese are more likely 
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to recognize the expansion of the gap, while redistributive policies get greater support 
from older groups. In the U.S., by contrast, there is no significant difference in the 
recognition of the gap by age groups while the elderly tend to avoid supporting the 
enforcement of redistribution.  
      A characteristic finding in both Japan and the U.S. suggests that the highly 
educated or high-income group, showing greater recognition of the expansion of the 
income gap, neither view that expansion as problematic nor expect the enforcement of 
redistributive policies. Moreover, the group of people regarding the expansion as a 
problem does not necessarily agree with the enforcement of redistribution, because a 
part of them failed to recognize the widening gap itself. This is exemplified by the 
tendency observed in Japanese women. They are less likely to support redistribution 
than Japanese men are, whereas a greater portion of them considers the expansion of 
the gap as a problem than the males. The Japan-U.S. difference in their support for 
redistributive policies can be also attributed to the contrasting levels of recognizing 
their own expanded gaps in these countries. 
 
4. Recognition of Income Determination 
      The preceding section found that the Japan-U.S. difference in recognizing the 
expansion of income gap affected their attitudes toward the redistributive policies. 
This section will examine the possibility that their values in desirable determinants of 
the income gap affect their recognition. Based on the responses to the question asking 
about how people’s incomes are decided (Question 42), Figure 12 shows the share of 
respondents who think income is decided by a particular factor. For both Japan and 
the U.S., the proportion of those who think one’s choice or effort decides his or her 
income is higher than the counterparts of any other factors: 68% in Japan and 84% in 
the U.S. The share of people having the opinion that one’s luck on occasions decides 
his or her income barely differs between Japan and the U.S.  
      These two countries, however, show clear contrasts when we make a 
comparison of the proportions of those who think inborn talent or academic 
background decides their income. One’s academic background is thought to be a 
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determinant of income by 77% of the U.S. residents; on the other hand, the proportion 
equals only 43% for Japanese. Similarly, those who think “one’s inborn talent decides 
income” amounts to 60% in the U.S.; in contrast, only 29% of Japanese agree with the 
idea. The three most major determinants of income are, in descending order, (1) 
choice or effort, (2) academic background, and (3) inborn talent for the U.S.; in 
contrast, the counterparts for Japan are (1) choice or effort, (2) luck on occasions and 
(3) academic background.  
      When thoughts on income gap are compared between Japan and the U.S., 
values in “what should decide one’s income” show greater international differences. 
Among the determinants in Figure 13, “choice and effort” collects the largest support 
in both Japan and the U.S. However, the proportion of those who think that academic 
background or inborn talent should decide income exceeds 50% in the U.S., whereas 
each corresponding share in Japan ranges from 10 to 15 percent only. Japanese thus 
have negative perception of other factors than choice or effort as determinants of 
income. The residents in the U.S., on the other hand, tend to tolerate the income gap 
caused by the difference in one’s inborn talent or academic background.  
      Is there any age difference in their value judgments on income determination? 
On each age group, Table 1 shows the proportion of those who support the factors in 
the first row as desirable determinants of income. Except for the people in their 70s or 
over, no large difference in their value judgments on those determinants can be found 
among the U.S. age groups. The Japanese, by contrast, show large age differences in 
their values. Especially, the proportion of those who think luck on occasions should 
decide one’s income is greater in the age groups under 40 than the others. In addition, 
the people who regard inborn talent as a desirable determinant of income occupy a 
greater share in younger age groups in Japan. Moreover, the larger proportions of 
those recognizing the income-gap expansion, observed in the age groups from the 40s 
to 60s, reflect their greater tendency to dislike the income being decided by luck on 
occasions9. 
                                                 
9 The inferences made by the results of this simple tabulation are qualitatively the same as those 
obtained from multiple probit analyses. 
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      The disagreement between values in what should decide people’s income and 
the recognition of how one’s income is decided may form their impression of the 
widening gap. Such a possibility will be now examined. The recognition of an 
expanded gap between income or earnings is, in Japan, more frequently observed 
among those having disagreements between the desirable and recognized determinants 
of income gap than the others. The disagreements are classified as follows (Table 2); 
(1) one’s income is decided by inborn talent, though it should not be, (2) one’s income 
is decided by their academic background, although it should not be, (3) one’s income 
is decided by luck on occasions, whereas it should not be, and (4) one’s income is 
decided by their family environment, although it should not be. 
      A clear Japan-U.S. difference can be found in values and recognition 
concerning people’s academic background and income. The proportion of those who 
think that people’s income is decided by their academic background though it should 
not be gains a majority of Japanese, 52.3%. The percentage of such group in the U.S. 
is only 21.2%. Among such group, the proportion of those recognizing past 
income-gap expansion is high in Japan. The same tendency cannot, however, be 
observed in the U.S. Hence, the recognition of the income gap in Japan partially stems 
from their recognition of a widening gap caused by inborn talent, luck, academic 
background and family environment rather than choice or effort. The percentage of 
those thinking that one’s income is decided by their family environment though it 
should not be, however, bears only a small difference between Japan and the U.S. 
 
The Japan-U.S. difference in recognizing equal opportunities 
 
      The analysis above found a large Japan-U.S. difference in value judgment on 
the effect of inborn talent and academic background on income. Contrary to 
expectation, however, the residents in Japan and the U.S. have similar values in other 
social and economic factors concerning the income gap, as shown in Table 3. In both 
countries, for instance, approximately 20% of them agree with the opinion that society 
should have a wide enough income gap for encouraging one’s willingness to work. 
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Those percentages are relatively low in the table. Similarly, no large Japan-U.S. 
difference is observed concerning the proportion of those who agree with the 
following ideas: (1) equal opportunity of becoming rich should be given by society; 
(2) there should be a society where everyone can gain enough income for a minimum 
standard of living if he or she works diligently; (3) our society should give enough 
help to people who are so poor and have difficulties in living. Comparing the 
proportions between the two countries, Japan has higher percentages of agreement 
with the first two opinions above. The percentage for the third idea is, in contrast, 
greater in the U.S. than Japan. 
      Recognition of the income gap at present, on the other hand, shows a large 
difference between Japan and the U.S. (Table 3). The most evident contrast is 
observed in the proportion of those supporting the opinion that equal opportunity of 
becoming rich is given by society even though one is poor at present. The percentage 
amounts to 15% in Japan, whereas the figure equals 43% in the U.S. A large majority 
of Japanese, in other words, believe that opportunities are not equal. Comparing 
among the age groups, the share of those supporting the idea of equal opportunities is 
higher for the groups of 50-plus than the younger in both Japan and the U.S. (Table 4). 
A large Japan-U.S. gap can be also found in the percentage of those agreeing with the 
opinion that their society is giving enough help to people who are so poor and have 
difficulties in living. That percentage equals 13% in Japan; the figure is 38% in the 
U.S. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
      Employing the data based on identical survey questions in Japan and the U.S., 
this study empirically analyzed the cause of rising perception of the widening income 
gap in Japan. The statistical indices show that the income gap has been greater in the 
U.S. than in Japan. A greater percentage of Japanese, however, recognizes or expects 
the widening income gap, compared to U.S. citizens. Between these countries, there is, 
nevertheless, no large difference in the proportion of those who regard their expanded 
gap as problematic or support the enforcement of redistributive policies. The 
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difference in their recognition and expectation is attributed to their distinct value 
judgments on the substance of the income gap. The Japanese, in particular, have a 
strongly negative perception of the expansion of the income gap caused by talent, 
academic background or luck, whereas such perception seems relatively weak in the 
U.S. A large portion of Japanese recognizes that one’s income is recently decided by 
his or her inborn talent, academic background or luck on occasions although they 
generally dislike their income being decided by any factors other than choice or effort. 
Such disagreement between the desirable and recognized determinants of income is 
thought to have raised the Japanese perception of the gap during recent years. Besides, 
the percentage of those who believe equal opportunities for becoming rich is very low 
in Japan. 
      The expansion of the income gap tends to be recognized by highly educated 
people or high-income earners in both Japan and the U.S. However, these groups of 
people are neither likely to view the income gap as problematic nor inclined to agree 
with the enforcement of redistributive policies. That is, the people recognizing the 
expansion of the income gap do not necessarily support redistribution. Altruistic 
people, in addition, tend to have negative perception of the increase in the income gap 
and support redistributive policies. Altruistic U.S. residents are also apt to recognize 
the income gap expansion. 
      An evident difference is observed in the effect of age. In Japan, people of 
middle age, in their forties or fifties, are likely to recognize the widening gap, while 
support for redistributive policies is stronger for higher age categories. In contrast, 
the portion of people recognizing the expansion of the gap does not differ by age in 
the U.S; besides, those aged seventy or over are more likely to oppose the 
enforcement of redistributive policies. 
      Summarizing the possible causes of the rising perception of the gap in Japan, 
the greater portion of Japanese recognize that their income has become more likely to 
be decided by luck on occasions, academic career or inborn talent, although they 
consider such change as undesirable at the same time. In addition, recognition of the 
expanding income gap is largely affected by their countries or ages, for the 
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differences in those attributes cause a large distinction of their values in what should 
decide one’s income.  
      Altogether, people are thought to recognize the gap between their incomes as 
they have begun to be decided by morally undesirable factors. In other words, they 
seem unlikely to react just to the rising index of income inequality including its Gini 
index or variance. From the latter half of the 1990’s, the traditional seniority-oriented 
wage system in Japan has begun to adopt a performance-based salary, decided by not 
only their effort but also their luck or talent. The traditional system, in contrast, used 
to be mainly based on the evaluation of the length of an employee’s overtime work 
and his or her effort. The recent change in income determination, becoming estranged 
from their traditional values, is thus thought to cause the increased perception of the 
widening income gap among the Japanese. 
      The perceived level of the income gap in Japan should be higher than the level 
indicated by the statistical data, for the Japanese think that the gap has been widened 
by unacceptable causes including one’s talent, luck, and academic background, rather 
than the desirable ones like choice or effort. In addition, the average executive salary 
in Japan has never reached the level of its counterpart in the U.S., maybe because 
Japanese society has a social norm placing great emphasis on effort. The people living 
in the U.S. are comparatively unlikely to perceive the gap expansion, even though it 
has actually continued to expand. They tolerate the gaps caused by one’s academic 
background and inborn talent; they also believe that equal opportunity of becoming 
rich is given by their society. It is thus inferred that such international division of 
thoughts can explain the Japan-U.S. difference between their attitudes toward the 
income gap in each country. 
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Figure 1: Trend in Economic Inequality in Japan and the U.S. 
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Figure 2: Recognition and Expectation of the Income Gap Expansion 
(Japan-U.S. comparison) 
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Figure 3: Recognition of and Attitude toward the Income Gap: Japan-U.S. Comparison 
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Figure 4: Thoughts on the Income-Gap Expansion by Income Group in Japan 
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Figure 5: Thoughts on the Income-Gap Expansion by Income Group in the U.S. 
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Figure 6: Thoughts on the Income-Gap Expansion by Age Group in Japan 
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Figure 7: Thoughts on the Income-Gap Expansion by Age Groups in the U.S. 
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Figure 8: Thoughts on the Widening Income Gap by Gender (Japan) 
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Figure 9: Thoughts on the Widening Income Gap by Gender (U.S.) 
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Figure 10: Marginal Effects of Individual Attributes on their Thoughts on Income Gap  
(Japan) 
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Figure 11: Marginal Effects of Individual Attributes on their Thoughts on Income Gap  
(U.S.) 
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List of Explanatory Variables and their Abbreviations in Figures 10 and 11 
Abbreviation Variable Abbreviation Variable 
F Female 4 4th household income quartile 
U Unmarried S Self-employed 
UF Unmarried female F Balance of financial asset (million yen) 
30 In one's 30s HP Value of Housing & properties (million yen)
40 In one's 40s HU Have unemployed 
50 In one's 50s EU Expecting unemployment 
60 In one's 60s EG Rate of expenditure growth in 2005 (%) 
70 Of 70 years of age and over IG Rate of income growth in 2005 (%) 
G Graduates RA Risk aversion (probability of rain) 
2 2nd household income quartile AL Altruistic attitude 
3 3rd household income quartile   
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Figure 12: What Decides One’s Income? 
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Figure 13: What should Decide One’s Income? 
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Table 1: Desirable determinants of income: Japan-U.S. comparison by age (%) 
     
 Choice or effort  
Luck on 
occasions Inborn talent 
Family 
environment  
Academic 
background 
Age Japan U.S.  Japan U.S. Japan U.S. Japan U.S.  Japan U.S.
<30 79.4 87.1  17.1 26.1 23.5 50.6 7.1 28.1  12.1 65.1
30s 83.7 88.5  15.3 25.6 20.4 47.1 11.3 28.4  11.0 66.3
40s 79.3 87.7  10.2 29.9 15.7 49.0 6.8 30.9  12.0 63.6
50s 75.1 89.6  9.3 26.4 12.0 54.0 6.6 26.1  8.8 63.1
60s 70.5 90.3  10.4 29.7 11.7 51.1 7.5 26.8  10.5 65.6
≥70 65.9 89.6  16.5 35.0 10.6 65.8 11.8 37.9  8.2 74.8
Average 76.6 88.8  11.6 28.6 15.2 52.8 7.8 29.5  10.5 66.1
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Values-Recognition Gap concerning Income Determination and 
Perception of Income Gap Expansion 
 
  Share among those having a particular disagreement between 
their desirable and recognized determinants of income 
 
Share in the entire
sample of each 
country (%) 
Recognizing the 
expansion of 
income gap (%)
Expecting the 
expansion of 
income gap (%) 
 Viewing the gap as problematic (%)Disagreement between 
desirable and recognized 
determinants of income  Japan U.S. Japan U.S. Japan U.S.  Japan U.S.
            
Income is decided by 
inborn talent though it 
should not be  
23.9 19.9 73.0 59.9 75.1 61.2 
 
72.8 74.0 
Income is decided by 
academic background 
though it should not be  
52.3 21.2 75.1 55.2 77.3 58.1 
 
77.1 75.5 
Income is decided by 
luck on occasions though 
it should not be  
37.9 29.0 74.9 61.1 79.4 62.2 
 
74.2 77.5 
Income is decided by 
one’s family environment
though it should not be  
31.8 32.2 75.8 60.0 80.2 62.8 
 
76.2 79.5 
Share in the entire 
sample of each country 
 - - 70.4 56.3 74.2 59.8  72.7 73.9 
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Table 3: Values and Recognition concerning the Income Gap 
Values Japan (%) U.S. (%) 
The society should have a wide enough income gap. 19.7 20.6 
Equal opportunity of becoming rich should be given by 
the society. 
69.7 63.7 
In the society, everyone should be able to gain enough 
income for a minimum standard of living 
86.0  81.8 
Our society should give enough help to people having 
difficulties in living 
61.9 63.6 
Recognition Japan (%) U.S. (%) 
Willingness to work is decided by whether or not the 
society has a wide enough income gap. 
28.8 25.5 
Equal opportunity of becoming rich is given by the 
society. 
15.3 43.0  
There are people who cannot gain enough income for a 
minimum standard of living. 
57.4 66.9 
Our society is giving enough help to people having 
difficulties in living. 
12.9 37.6 
 
 
 
Table 4: Proportion of Those Who Think that Equal Opportunity for 
Becoming Rich is Given by the Society (%) 
Age  20s 30s 40s 50s 60s 70s+ 
Japan 9.9 13.7 11.4 16.8 20.2 23.3 
U.S. 39.7 35.9 42.9 45.4 50.8 50.7 
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Appendix 1: Questions in Osaka University 21st Century Center of Excellence Panel 
Survey 
 
27.  Suppose that you found a well-known charity that gave financial help to people who 
typically had about one-fifth of your family income per person. Up to how much of your 
own family income per month would you be willing to give the charity if you knew the 
money would go directly to benefit these people? (X ONE Box) 
 
1   Up to 2 % of your family income per month 
2   Up to 5 % of your family income per month 
3   Up to 10 % of your family income per month 
4   Up to 20 % of your family income per month 
5   No help at all 
 
 
28.  Suppose that you found a well-known charity that gave financial help to people who 
typically had about one-fifth of your family income per person. Up to how much of your 
own family income per month would you be willing to give the charity if you knew the 
charity would give twice the amount of your donation directly to benefit these people? 
(X ONE Box) 
1   Up to 2 % of your family income per month 
2   Up to 5 % of your family income per month 
3   Up to 10 % of your family income per month 
4   Up to 20 % of your family income per month 
5   No help at all 
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42.  The following statements are ideas on how people’s income and standard of living are 
decided in the US. What is your opinion of these ideas? (X ONE Box For Each Row) 
 
 
 
 
Whether or not one can gain an income or a status that  
one wishes for is decided by one’s choice or effort ……........... 1   2   3   4   5  
Whether or not one can gain an income or a status that  
one wishes for is decided by one’s luck on occasions ............... 1   2   3   4   5  
Whether or not one can gain an income or a status that  
one wishes for is decided by one’s inborn talent ....................... 1   2   3   4   5  
Whether or not one can gain an income or a status that one wishes 
for is decided by one’s family environment that one grew up in 
                                       .......................... 1   2   3   4   5  
Whether or not one can gain an income or a status that one  
wishes for is decided by one’s academic background ................ 1   2   3   4   5  
 
One’s willingness to work is decided by whether or not it  
is a society where a wide enough income gap exists ................. 1   2   3   4   5  
Even though one is poor at present, equal opportunity of  
becoming rich is given by the society ......................................... 1   2   3   4   5  
Even if one works diligently, there are people who cannot  
gain enough income for a minimum standard of living .............. 1   2   3   4   5  
Our society is giving enough help to people who are so  
poor and have difficulties in living ............................................. 1   2   3   4   5  
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43.  The following ideas are about how people’s income and standard of living should be 
decided. What is your opinion on these ideas? (X ONE Box For EACH Row) 
 
 
 
 
 
Whether or not one can gain an income or a status that one wishes for 
should be decided by one’s choice or effort ............................... 1   2   3   4   5  
Whether or not one can gain an income or a status that one wishes for 
should be decided by one’s luck on occasions ............................ 1   2   3   4   5  
Whether or not one can gain an income or a status that one wishes for 
should be decided by one’s inborn talent .................................... 1   2   3   4   5  
Whether or not one can gain an income or a status that one wishes for 
should be decided by one’s family environment that they grew up in 
                                       .......................... 1   2   3   4   5  
Whether or not one can gain an income or a status that one wishes for 
should be decided by one’s academic background ..................... 1   2   3   4   5  
 
One’s willingness to work should be decided by whether or not it is a 
society where a wide enough income gap exists ......................... 1   2   3   4   5  
Even though one is poor at present, equal opportunity of becoming rich 
should be given by the society .................................................... 1   2   3   4   5  
If one works diligently, there should be a society where everyone can 
gain enough income for a minimum standard of living .............. 1   2   3   4   5  
Our society should give enough help to people who are so poor and 
have difficulties in living ............................................................ 1   2   3   4   5  
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44.  How do you think the following gaps in the US have changed in last 5 years? (X ONE 
Box For EACH Row) 
 
 
 
 
Gap between income or earnings .................................................. 1   2   3   4   5  
Gap between assets such as savings, stocks, land and housing that  
one holds ..................................................................................... 1   2   3   4   5  
Income gap due to difference between families which one grew up in 
                                       .......................... 1   2   3   4   5  
Gap between spending standard ..................................................... 1   2   3   4   5  
 
 
45.  How do you think the following gaps in the US will change in next 5 years? (X ONE 
Box For EACH Row) 
 
 
 
 
Gap between income or earnings .................................................. 1   2   3   4   5  
Gap between sums of assets such as savings, stocks, land and  
housing that one holds ................................................................. 1   2   3   4   5  
Income gap due to difference between families which one grows up in 
                                       .......................... 1   2   3   4   5  
Gap between spending standard .................................................... 1   2   3   4   5  
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46.  How much of a problem do you think the current expansion of the income gap is? (X 
ONE Box) 
1   It’s a big problem 
2   It’s somewhat of a problem 
3   Neither 
4   It’s not much of a problem 
5   It’s not a problem at all 
6   I don’t know 
 
 
47.  What is your opinion if the government alters taxation system and social security policy 
indicated below? (X ONE Box For EACH Row) 
 
 
 
 
Using taxation system and social security policy, to enforce  
redistribution of income from the rich to the poor ...................... 1   2   3   4   5  
Increase supply of public housing for people of low income ....... 1   2   3   4   5  
To maintain the pension system, decrease pension benefit level 
                                       .......................... 1   2   3   4   5  
To maintain pension benefit level, increase the amount which the  
pension is covered by insurance .................................................. 1   2   3   4   5  
Raise the age which pension payment starts and keep the pension  
benefit level ................................................................................. 1   2   3   4   5  
Decrease the pension benefits paid to people of high income ...... 1   2   3   4   5  
Tighten the standard for providing welfare benefits ..................... 1   2   3   4   5 
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Appendix 2: Estimation of the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) Parameter 
 
  Each individual coefficient of constant relative risk aversion was estimated through the 
following procedure, referring to the method in Kimball et al. (2005).  
  First, the measurement of risk preference is based on the data collected through a series of 
questions below. 
 
8.  Considering the following two ways of receiving your monthly income, which is 
preferable to you? Assume that the job assignment is the same under these situations. If 
you are a dependent (e.g., student, housewife, etc.), answer this question taking your 
living expense as your monthly income. (X ONE Box) 
 
 
       or 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  From the above the combination of choices between the variable wages and the constant 
ones, the degree of risk tolerance, defined as the inverse of CRRA coefficient, can be 
classified into the following four categories: 
     (1) the variable wages in the question 8 and 8a, 
     (2) the variable wage in the question 8 while the stable one in 8a, 
     (3) the constant wage in the question 8 while the variable one in 8b, 
     (4) the constant wages in the question 8 and 8b. 
 
2  Your monthly income is guaranteed to 
increase by 5% → (Answer Qu. 8b) 
1  Your monthly income has a 50% chance 
of doubling, but also has a 50% chance of 
decreasing by 30% → (Answer Qu. 8a) 
8a.  Of the following two jobs, which would you 
prefer? (X ONE Box) 
1   A job that has a 50% chance of the monthly 
income doubling, but also a 50% chance of 
the monthly income being cut in half 
2   A job with which your monthly income is 
guaranteed to increase by 5% 
8b.  Of the following two jobs, which would you 
prefer? (X ONE Box) 
1   A job that has a 50% chance of the monthly 
income doubling, but also a 50% chance of 
the monthly income decreasing by 10% 
2   A job with which your monthly income is 
guaranteed to increase by 5% 
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That is, the degree of risk tolerance becomes weaker for categories of larger numbers. The 
category (1), for instance, shows the highest risk tolerance among the four. 
  In the next step, the range of risk tolerance for each category will be set, assuming the 
CRRA utility function. For example, the coefficient of risk aversion parameter to realize the 
indifference between the two choices in the question 8b will be identified as follows. In the 
question 8b, the CRRA coefficient, γ, has to satisfy the following equation when the expected 
utility is indifferent: 
γγγ
γγγ
−
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1
)1.01(5.0
1
25.0
111
. 
The estimate of γ equals 5.29, which becomes the lower bound for the respondents in category 
(4) above. In other words, only the individuals having the CRRA parameter more than or 
equal to 5.29 should have proceeded from the question 8 to 8b and then could have been 
classified in (4). The upper bound should be, on the one hand, infinite10. Applying the same 
thought to the question 8 and 8a similarly, the upper and lower bounds of risk tolerance 
parameter, or the inverse of CRRA coefficient, of each category can be derived as shown in 
the table below. 
 
Table A1: The Lower and Upper bounds of Risk Tolerance Parameter (with their 
corresponding values of CRRA coefficients) for the Four Categories  
 
  Bounds (Tolerance) Bounds (CRRA) 
Categories  Lower Upper Lower Upper 
(1)  1.26 ∞ 0 0.80 
(2)  0.53 1.26 0.80 1.90 
(3)  0.19 0.53 1.90 5.29 
(4)    0.00 0.19 5.29 ∞ 
 
  Third, employing the obtained pairs of upper and lower bounds, the expected values of risk 
tolerance coefficient will be derived through the maximum likelihood estimation. Let θ denote 
the parameter of risk tolerance and assume that it follows the log-normal distribution, or 
                                                 
10 A finite upper bound of the CRRA parameter could not be derived because none of the questions 
presented a wage schedule being variable and still safer than the one in the question 8b. 
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) ,( N~ln σx μθ≡ , 
where μ and σ denote the mean and standard deviation of the normal distribution respectively. 
Besides, suppose θ j and θ j signify its lower and upper bounds for the category j (= 1, 2, 3, 
4) respectively. Those bounds then take the estimates in Table A1. The probability for θ of 
individual i, iix θln≡ , to be in jth class can be expressed as: 
⎟⎟⎠
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The mark Φ, in addition, denotes the cumulative distribution function of the normal 
distribution. The logarithm of the above probability can constitute a log-likelihood function 
defined as: 
( ) [ ] ( )jcPjc
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Let 1[ci = j] signifies the variable to take one for the inclusion of individual i in class j; 
otherwise, it equals zero. In addition, suppose that letter I and J indicate the total number of 
respondents and classes respectively. Employing the parameter μ and σ through the maximum 
likelihood estimation with the log-likelihood function, each expected value of θ in j can be 
obtained by the following equation (Kimball et al., 2005). 
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Table A2: The Estimates of Risk Tolerance Parameter (with their corresponding CRRA 
values) for the Four Categories 
  Japan United States 
Categories  # of obs. Tolerance CRRA # of obs. Tolerance CRRA 
(1)  144 2.85 0.35 72 2.68 0.37 
(2)  334 0.80 1.26 157 0.79 1.26 
(3)  632 0.32 3.15 371 0.32 3.16 
(4)  2,005 0.07 14.65 1179   0.07 14.65 
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Appendix 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Japan U.S. 
 Sample 
size 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Sample 
size 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Japan-U.S.
mean 
Difference
(JPN-USA)
Recognition of gap 3653 0.703 0.457 3025 0.561 0.496 0.143 ***
Expectation of gap 3660 0.742 0.438 3010 0.599 0.490 0.143 ***
Support for redistribution 3652 0.517 0.500 3017 0.453 0.498 0.064 ***
Viewing gap as problematic 3537 0.726 0.446 2973 0.738 0.440 -0.012  
       
Ideas on how people’s income and standard of living are 
decided      
Choice/Effort 3737 0.691 0.462 3062 0.858 0.350 -0.166 ***
Luck on occasions 3736 0.478 0.500 3059 0.541 0.498 -0.063 ***
Inborn talent 3728 0.297 0.457 3050 0.617 0.486 -0.320 ***
Family environment 3728 0.381 0.486 3038 0.586 0.493 -0.205 ***
Academic background 3727 0.435 0.496 3051 0.792 0.406 -0.357 ***
Income gap 3712 0.292 0.455 3040 0.262 0.440 0.030 ***
Equal opportunity 3732 0.154 0.361 3045 0.440 0.496 -0.286 ***
Minimum income 3733 0.579 0.494 3056 0.683 0.466 -0.104 ***
Enough help 3731 0.130 0.336 3062 0.383 0.486 -0.253 ***
Ideas on how people’s income and standard of living should be decided     
Choice/Effort 3721 0.766 0.424 3051 0.885 0.319 -0.120 ***
Luck on occasions 3727 0.116 0.320 3044 0.286 0.452 -0.170 ***
Inborn talent 3712 0.152 0.359 3046 0.524 0.500 -0.372 ***
Family environment 3725 0.078 0.268 3043 0.296 0.457 -0.219 ***
Academic background 3722 0.105 0.307 3038 0.660 0.474 -0.555 ***
Income gap 3706 0.200 0.400 3025 0.213 0.409 -0.013
Equal opportunity 3714 0.706 0.456 3037 0.655 0.476 0.052 ***
Minimum income 3726 0.869 0.338 3051 0.836 0.370 0.033 ***
Enough help 3718 0.627 0.484 3045 0.652 0.476 -0.025 **
       
Female 3763 0.529 0.499 3093 0.563 0.496 -0.035 ***
Unmarried 3752 0.137 0.344 3081 0.601 0.490 -0.464 ***
Unmarried Female 3752 0.065 0.246 3055 0.333 0.471 -0.268 ***
Not employed male 3763 0.067 0.250 3120 0.124 0.330 -0.057 ***
Employed female 3763 0.333 0.471 3120 0.314 0.464 0.019 *
Not employed female 3763 0.183 0.386 3120 0.189 0.391 -0.006
(Continued on next page)   
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(Continued)       
       
Age groups       
30s 3763 0.166 0.372 2986 0.161 0.368 0.004
40s 3763 0.216 0.411 2986 0.199 0.400 0.016
50s 3763 0.271 0.444 2986 0.213 0.409 0.058 ***
60s 3763 0.234 0.424 2986 0.139 0.346 0.095 ***
70+ 3763 0.024 0.152 2986 0.149 0.356 -0.125 ***
       
Graduates 3632 0.211 0.408 3092 0.353 0.478 -0.143 ***
       
Household income quartile      
2nd quartile 3102 0.390 0.488 2870 0.176 0.381 0.214 ***
3rd quartile 3102 0.131 0.337 2870 0.239 0.427 -0.108 ***
4th quartile 3102 0.184 0.388 2870 0.179 0.384 0.005
       
Self-employed 3686 0.095 0.294 2741 0.063 0.243 0.033 ***
       
Financial assets  
(in million yen) 
2830 14.444 25.850 2767 28.976 66.023 -14.531 ***
Housing and properties  
(in million yen) 
3131 22.887 32.124 2942 25.783 36.574 -2.896 ***
Experience of unemployment 3700 0.187 0.390 3034 0.228 0.420 -0.041 ***
Expecting unemployment 3627 0.271 0.444 3025 0.292 0.455 -0.021 *
Rate of consumption growth 
(%) 
3386 1.414 4.288 2878 3.003 3.919 -1.588 ***
Rate of income growth (%) 3380 -0.619 3.971 2880 1.625 3.726 -2.245 ***
Risk-aversion index 
1- chance of rain (%) / 100 
3690 0.501 0.202 2936 0.348 0.298 0.152 ***
CRRA coefficient 3115 10.217 5.992 1779 10.496 5.861 -0.278
Altruism 3633 0.614 0.487 3047 0.781 0.414 0.168 ***
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Appendix 4: Estimation of the Probit Models to Explain the Recognition and Value 
Judgments concerning the Gap and the Support for Redistributive Policies 
 
A.  Empirical results for Japan (marginal effects (%)) 
 
Dependent variables Recognizing 
the gap 
Expecting 
the gap 
Viewing the 
gap as 
problematic 
Supporting 
redistribution
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female -0.036* -0.045** 0.036* -0.046* 
Unmarried -0.021 0.000 -0.028 0.033 
Unmarried female 0.034 0.052 0.039 0.098 
     
Age groups     
30s 0.004 0.041 -0.032 0.001 
40s 0.071* 0.106*** 0.029 0.040 
50s 0.091** 0.099*** 0.040 0.124** 
60s 0.060 0.070* 0.009 0.155*** 
70+ 0.045 -0.023 0.054 0.164** 
     
Graduates 0.118*** 0.081*** -0.000 0.046* 
     
Household income quartile    
2nd quartile 0.030 0.037* -0.025 0.018 
3rd quartile 0.066** 0.090*** -0.068* -0.018 
4th quartile 0.055* 0.059** -0.047 -0.091** 
     
Self-employed -0.005 -0.013 0.049* -0.007 
Financial assets 0.001* 0.0003 -0.001*** -0.001 
Housing and properties -0.0002 -0.001* -0.0001 -0.0005 
Experience of unemployment -0.016 -0.028 -0.014 0.010 
Expectation of unemployment 0.056*** 0.030 0.056*** 0.030 
Rate of consumption growth (%) 0.002 0.004* 0.002 0.002 
Rate of income growth (%) -0.004 -0.005** -0.004 -0.003 
Risk-aversion index: 
1- chance of rain (%) / 100 
-0.026 0.034 -0.001 0.055 
Altruistic (willing to donate) 0.017 0.008 0.047** 0.051** 
Observations 2284 2280 2214 2280 
Psudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
Log likelihood -1279.52 -1181.95 -1235.26 -1536.81 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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B.  Empirical results for the U.S. (marginal effects (%)) 
 
Dependent variables Recognizing 
the gap 
Expecting 
the gap 
Viewing the 
gap as 
problematic 
Supporting 
redistribution
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female -0.075** -0.056 0.068** 0.009 
Unmarried -0.090** -0.045 -0.015 0.014 
Unmarried female 0.109** 0.055 -0.007 -0.035 
     
Age groups     
30s -0.021 0.018 0.012 -0.023 
40s -0.010 0.010 0.007 -0.029 
50s 0.013 0.002 0.053 0.019 
60s 0.003 -0.011 0.048 -0.049 
70+ -0.042 -0.085* -0.041 -0.124*** 
     
Graduates 0.106*** 0.050** 0.024 0.000 
     
Household income quartile    
2nd quartile -0.045 -0.022 -0.027 -0.101*** 
3rd quartile -0.045 -0.023 -0.051* -0.148*** 
4th quartile -0.063 -0.039 -0.077** -0.211*** 
     
Self-employed -0.026 -0.028 -0.020 -0.067 
Financial assets 0.0001 -0.0001 0.00002 -0.00004 
Housing and properties 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.001* 
Experience of unemployment 0.013 -0.001 0.013 0.049* 
Expectation of unemployment 0.060** 0.056** 0.081*** 0.023 
Rate of consumption growth (%) 0.001 0.006** 0.012*** 0.009*** 
Rate of income growth (%) 0.006* 0.003 -0.003 0.002 
Risk-aversion index: 
1- chance of rain (%) / 100 
-0.009 0.006 0.049 0.089** 
Altruistic (willing to donate) 0.055** 0.079*** 0.114*** 0.064** 
Observations 2014 2010 1976 2013 
Psudo R2 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04 
Log likelihood -1352.08 -1326.87 -1072.03 -1333.51 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
